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| Victor Davis Hanson |
By Victor Davis Hanson, Mar. 25, 2014, National Review
The
Roosevelt administration once talked loudly of pivoting to Asia to thwart a
rising Japan. As a token of its seriousness, in May 1940 it moved the home port
of the Seventh Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor — but without beefing up
the fleet’s strength.
The then-commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral James
O. Richardson, an expert on the Japanese Imperial Navy, protested vehemently
over such a reckless redeployment. He felt that the move might invite, but
could not guard against, surprise attack.
Richardson was eventually relieved of his command and
his career was ruined — even as he was later proved right when Japan attacked
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Britain
at the same time promoted a loud Singapore Strategy, trumpeting its Malaysian
base as the “Gibraltar of the Pacific.” But London did not send out up-to-date
planes, carriers, or gunnery to the Pacific.
Japan
was not impressed. It surprise-attacked the base right after Pearl Harbor. The
British surrendered Singapore in February 1942, in the most ignominious defeat
in British military history.
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